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3. ‘The African listener‘: state-controlled radio, subjectivity, and agency in colonial 




Many analyses of media in Africa and elsewhere have emphasized the change in the relation 
between producers and consumers of media content that new media such as mobile telephony 
and the internet apparently have instigated (Lister et al. 2009; Ekine 2010).1 Whereas in ‘old’ 
(mass) media the two areas were clearly separated and producers determined the content of 
what was to be consumed, new media have enabled consumers to enter the production sphere 
by giving them access to the means of production. Although media theorists since the 
publication of Stuart Hall’s seminal 1973 ‘encoding/decoding’ article have pointed out the 
significant role of reception and the relative liberty of consumers to interpret media content in 
their own way, the fact that users of new media have access to the means of production led 
some analysts to see the advent of the ‘produser’ as a result (Bruns 2008; Ellcessor 2012). 
However, a look at the history of radio shows that listeners in colonial and postcolonial 
African societies not only made sense of media content in their own way – which fits into 
Hall’s audience reception model – but also significantly influenced radio programming and 
the distribution of media content directly, and subverted the ideological intentions of colonial 
and postcolonial governments alike. 
 
As my analysis of listening practices in Zambia shows, listeners used spaces of agency not 
just to choose and assess content and reinterpret it in creative ways, but also to influence 
programming indirectly and directly. However, the relations between the state, broadcasters 
and listeners were complex and identities were not imposed upon nor simply rejected by 
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listeners but rather negotiated in spaces in front of the radio set and in other media, e.g. letters 
to the station or newspapers. Broadcasters resisted strong state control and were aware of the 
central problem of their work: listeners’ wishes needed to be taken into account if radio’s 
ideological project ― the creation of colonial/national subjects ― was to be successful. This 
chapter looks specifically at these interactions between listeners, broadcasters and the state 
and demonstrates how they negotiated media, social change and politics in colonial and post-
colonial societies. It asks what role radio played in everyday experiences of social change and 
it challenges the idea of the ‘produser’ as a new phenomenon fundamentally changing the 
power relations between producers and consumers through new media. It does so by looking 
at the ways radio listeners made sense of programmes and actually influenced production. It 
is based on original research undertaken in 2006 and 2008 for my Ph.D. thesis ‘Promoting 
National Unity: the Role of Radio Broadcasting in the Process of Decolonisation in Zambia 
and Namibia’. After a brief introduction to the history of radio and colonial media policy in 
Northern Rhodesia, I map out the dialectical dynamic between producers and listeners that 
developed soon after the introduction of radio to African audiences. I show the significant 
influence these audiences exerted on media content. 
 
RADIO IN LATE COLONIALISM 
From its early years, broadcasting to an African audience was a project of colonial 
information control. Although radio (mostly in the form of relays to European settlers) had 
been introduced to African colonies very early after its establishment in the metropoles, 
African colonial subjects as an audience only came into the focus of administrators during the 
1930s. A ‘Committee on Broadcasting Services in the Colonies’ in 1936 recommended to use 
broadcasting in the British Empire as ‘”an instrument of advanced government” to improve 
communication between governments and governed and to enlighten and educate the masses 
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as well as to entertain them’ (Armour 1984: 359f). During the Second World War, as part of a 
general propaganda effort to reach colonial subjects and mobilize them for the war, the first 
radio stations were set up to broadcast to African soldiers stationed in East Africa and in the 
Asian war theatres, and to their families in the colonies. But colonial officials and researchers 
remained convinced that Africans would not be able to ‘understand’ radio, i.e. to consume 
programme content as intended, just as they did not ‘understand’ other modern media, such as 
cinema and photography (Ambler 2001; Burns 2000). Africans, they argued, would think of 
voice recordings as ‘witchcraft’ (Franklin 1974: 172f). But radio ― more than movies and 
photographs ― was dangerous because its very technology transcended state boundaries 
which made it much more difficult to control. One of the white producers at the first station 
broadcasting to African audiences in the colony, Peter Fraenkel (1959: 18) remembers 
officials’ and settler politicians’ reaction to the idea of selling affordable, battery-powered 
radio sets to colonial subjects: ‘They knew the African, they grumbled, and the African would 
never want such a set or understand what was broadcast, or if he did he would listen to 
Moscow [i.e. ‘Radio Moscow’, the Soviet global propaganda radio, RH]. If there had to be 
wireless sets for Africans they should be pre-set to one station only’. The first Information 
Officer in Northern Rhodesia, Harry Franklin, continuously campaigned for developing such 
a set and argued against the idea of pre-setting it. He explained that it would be very easy to 
‘un-pre-set’ such a radio and that the popularity loss for the government that such a move 
entailed would far outweigh the advantages of controlling access to global radio. Franklin, 
who had organized the broadcasts during the war, understood that there was a huge demand 
for entertainment and news broadcasts, and that simple propaganda needed to be replaced by 
a more sophisticated ‘public relations’ approach (Morris 2000: 311; Franklin 1974: 165). It 
would take twelve years before radio for African listeners was firmly and lastingly 
established in Northern Rhodesia as well as in other British and, later, French colonies.2 
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Two different insights stand at the beginning of broadcasting to an African audience in the 
British colonies. Firstly, if the colonial governments did not provide mass media, colonial 
subjects would look elsewhere and would be exposed to unwanted propaganda. Secondly, the 
mobilization of Africans for the war effort made a coordinated media strategy necessary 
which led to the establishment of Information Departments responsible for all media 
published by the colonial government. These also established radio stations to broadcast war 
propaganda. Although this first effort at broadcasting was discontinued after the war, the 
Information Departments remained, and the insistence of Information Officers as well as 
social unrest, labour conflicts and the increasing power of nationalist organizations convinced 
colonial administrations to not only establish fully-fledged radio stations for African 
audiences but also to put considerable effort into the development of cheap, battery-powered 
radio sets that would enable broader and deeper dissemination of the new medium in colonial 
society. After the establishment of the Central African Federation (CAF)3 in 1953, political 
propaganda became the dominating feature of news and actuality programmes. Censorship 
and control became everyday features of work for broadcasters, especially after the Central 
African Broadcasting Services (CABS) were integrated as ‘African Services’ into the new 
Federal Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) in 1958. News was produced in Salisbury (now 
Harare, Zimbabwe), and the Lusaka station was relegated to simply translate the news, with 
monitors (e.g. missionaries) listening in to ensure literal translation. 
 
BEYOND INFORMATION CONTROL 
From the medium’s beginnings in the war, broadcasters understood that radio programmes 
had to go beyond pure propaganda and had to engage with their audience to be successful. 
One early example for programmes that provided a useful service beyond pure propaganda is 
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the messaging service organized for the Kings’ African Rifles (KAR) soldiers and their 
families, who were invited to the studios to read (prepared) statements to be broadcast on 
either the Nairobi or Lusaka stations. By the time of the establishment of the Central African 
Broadcasting Station (CABS) in Lusaka in 1949, information officers’ ideas about how to 
engage with their African audience in a meaningful way had developed further. CABS 
programmes went beyond information control (which in the news and actuality formats was 
still an essential part of the station) and were geared at producing colonial subjects. This is 
shown in a 1946 annual report by Harry Franklin who would become the first Director of 
CABS. It explains the plans for a future broadcasting scheme of talks for ‘mass education 
among adult Africans’ and lists nine different topics such as ‘work’, ‘home life’, ‘health’ or 
‘economy’, with very specific ideas about what kind of subjects these talks should present as 
a goal for listeners to strive for. Under the heading ‘work’, Franklin mentioned values such as 
‘responsibility and service; honesty; dignity of labour’; under ‘economy’ ‘uses and abuses of 
money, savings, what and how to buy’, but also ‘why we have taxes’ and information on the 
‘Native treasuries’ and other government departments connected to finance.4 While other 
areas were more openly connected to propagating government policies and legitimizing the 
colonial system in Northern Rhodesia, most were geared towards ‘educating’ listeners on 
how to behave in the realms of the private and of work, and thus to ultimately orient 
themselves towards the values of a European, capitalist society. Radio was supposed to 
produce ‘modern’ subjects. 
 
Radio ― as a medium as well as a technical apparatus ― embodied and transported notions 
of ‘modernity’ better than other late colonial projects. After the invention of the ‘Saucepan 
Special’5, cheap battery-powered radio sets became affordable to the African middle and 
working classes. Thus, radio became a symbol and proponent of modernity that penetrated 
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deeply into colonial subjects’ private and social lives. Talks on the aforementioned subjects, 
news items about modern infrastructure (dams, railways, factories), together with the 
diffusion of radio itself and its symbolism are ‘classic examples of technopolitics, the 
operation of political rule through the technical workings of social infrastructures’ (Larkin 
2008: 59). Radio ‘was an information order, to be layered on top of older orders, intended to 
enounce, through the sublime nature of its technology and the authoritative nature of its 
content, the power and promise of modern life’ (Larkin 2008: 50). The Northern Rhodesia 
Information Department took advantage of this, and consciously used radio – in the 
programmes but also in print publications targeting listeners – as a tool to imagine and 
produce modern subjects. The African Listener (the title of a programme magazine) was a 
modern, working or middle class father of a nuclear family, living in a ‘modern‘ home, 
donning clothes oriented towards European styles. Items in magazines such as The African 
Listener and Nshila – The Way (published by the NR Information Department) or The Radio 
Post (published by the FBC) continually promoted a ‘modern‘ lifestyle, emphasizing the need 
for Africans to educate themselves and work hard so they would advance socially and benefit 
from the possibilities the colonial state would offer them.6 
 
Radio programmes constructed the ideal colonial subject in a variety of formats. Broadcasters 
had, within the framework set and controlled by the Information Department, considerable 
freedom to develop cultural programmes, most significantly radio plays. These transported 
ideas about modernity and the modern African in much more subtle ways than open colonial 
propaganda. One successful programme that not just presented a modern lifestyle and modern 
values as desirable but also addressed the conflicts connected to social change was the soap 
opera ‘Shimwansa Kopolo’. A long-running radio serial ‘designed to let our audience identify 
itself with the hero who suffers the common experiences of town life and solves his problems 
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in an intelligent, modern way’, this programme introduced a multifaceted cast of characters 
that symbolized different stages of development who – as representatives of African 
‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ – acted out the resulting conflicts on different levels. Other serials 
worked with similar motives, usually culminating in a moral about modern life in the colony. 
Many stories included topics of ‘modern’ everyday life such as hygiene, usually with a 
simple message, for example: ‘people [...] should use warm water and not hot water for 
washing woollen things’ (Powdermaker 1962: 248) but many added commentaries on 
changing social relations.7 As colonial administrators, broadcasters and scholars agreed that 
African listeners looked to the radio ‘to provide explanations, give advice and act as an 
arbiter of social morality’ (Mytton 1983: 85), it was considered a perfect medium to 
communicate the modernization ideology that was such a crucial part of late British 
colonialism. 
 
LISTENERS’ RESISTANCE TO PROPAGANDA 
Because of its liberal policy on news reporting and the employment of African producers in 
entertainment programmes, the CABS had become extremely popular with African listeners. 
However, the stations’ efforts at making their listeners modern subjects who internalized the 
values of ultimately capitalist societies (individualism, ‘work ethics’, hygiene and health 
concerns, acceptance of the institutions of a modern state) often backfired. Listeners 
compared the way their desired lifestyle was presented by the radio with their actual situation 
and found the radio wanting. As the anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker (1962: 250) found 
during fieldwork in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia in 1953, listeners viewed programmes 
that promoted new farming techniques – mostly geared at enabling farmers to produce 
surplus to sell on the market – very critically: 
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These Europeans have come here and introduced the new methods of farming, but they have 
pushed the Africans to rocky places. Now they force Africans to use the European methods of 
farming in these rocky places. How can they expect us to grow food on rocks? If they know 
better, then why didn’t they occupy these rocky places and improve them? The Europeans are 
unfair. 
 
Another listener explained the difficulties for African farmers to implement the 
recommended techniques as follows: 
 
I remember hearing a talk about agriculture. I heard that ridges would be introduced so as to 
keep the fertility of the soil unharmed by running water or wind. I also heard that people were 
refusing to make these contour lines or ridges because it was such hard work. I feel that people 
were right to refuse, because we have no special machines to work with. Europeans have 
tractors, ploughs, and other special farm equipment to make the contour lines. But we Africans 
don’t have them. How can we make contour lines with hoes only? This is very hard work 
(Powdermaker 1962: 251). 
 
The genuine efforts of colonial information officers and radio producers to reach their 
audience and get the message across by attaching it to cultural forms familiar to the listeners 
could seriously backfire, such as in this example: 
 
An experiment was undertaken in the production of a musical programme in which short 
‘slogans’ based on traditional proverbs were introduced. Subjects such as ‘Kill that Fly’ were 
used, but such facts as could be derived from these experiments confirmed the conclusions 
reached in other fields that the ‘slogan’ or the ‘saw’ is not the potent force in African life it has 
sometimes been made out to be. It was demonstrated fairly clearly that most children brought up 
in the labour centres did not know their tribal sayings and cross samples of listeners were 
depressingly adept at missing the point of any new ‘saw’ tried out on them (Northern Rhodesia 
Information Department 1954: 6). 
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From other accounts, a more detailed picture of what had happened emerges. The programme 
had been developed in collaboration with a Zambian novelist, Stephen Mpashi, who 
documented Bemba proverbs and proposed to attach new meanings to them. The slogan 
mentioned in the quote was intended to make listeners aware of the dangers of flies on their 
food which could be carriers of diseases. This is the full slogan: 
 
Though it’s small: yet it’s a heavy load. 
The fly: though small, is dangerous. 
It gives us disease: You, kill that fly! 
(Fraenkel 1959: 151; emphasis in the original). 
 
The first line (in the original Bemba) refers to bundles of corpses traditionally tied for 
funerals in parts of Zambia – they are small but a heavy load. But, as the report noted, the 
slogan led to bewilderment among recipients and it could even be dangerously 
misinterpreted. Listeners took the first line, which it seems was intended to provide a 
metaphor for the rest, and attached a completely different interpretation to it. Here are two 
examples of such a reinterpretation: 
 
[T]hough it’s small, it’s a heavy load. One man can spoil the happiness of an entire village; if 
he’s a witch he will bring fear and suspicion. ‘Kill that fly?’ That means – well – nowadays 
Europeans interfere. They won’t let us kill witches, but one should chase such a person out of 
the community. 
 
Though it’s small, it’s a heavy load. Though the Europeans are few, yet they are powerful. 
They’ll get the better of us over this business of Federation. Though they are few, they are so 
powerful that we’ll never be able to drive them out of our country (Fraenkel 2005: 183). 
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As it turns out, behind the ‘misunderstandings’ stood the assumptions colonial broadcasters 
made about how African proverbs worked. Their simple analogy was taken up and 
reinterpreted by listeners in a way that reflected colonial power relations as they were 
mirrored in the station itself. The very popular CABS had lost listeners’ trust when it started 
to promote the political setup of the Central African Federation, which was dreaded by most 
Zambians as a spread of Southern Rhodesian settler domination to the north. This anecdote is 
an example of how listeners could reinterpret information they got from the radio in a wholly 
different context, not intended by the original producers. Such practices of subversive or 
‘oppositional’ readings (Hall 1980) were not limited to radio; the propaganda movies of the 
Central African Film Unit were reinterpreted in much the same way (Ambler 2001: 100). 
 
Again, Zambian listeners were very aware of the power relations in the colony, of which the 
CABS was an intricate part. The original purpose of these programmes – namely to 
accompany and foster social change introduced by colonial policies – could be subverted by 
listeners. In their political resistance to CABS as a mouthpiece of the Federation, they even 
went further. With the establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953, CABS was 
forced to propagate the ‘racial partnership’ model and a politically overarching structure that, 
nationalists suspected, would economically advantage Southern Rhodesia and make it 
politically dominant in the Federal institutions. While settler politicians explained that in their 
idea of ‘partnership’, ‘the Native has joined the firm and has his foot on the lower rungs of 
the ladder’, NR nationalists knew the meaning of that metaphor better: ‘Partnership […] is a 
ladder for Europeans in Northern Rhodesia to climb on us’ (Rotberg 1967: 120, 137). 
 
LISTENERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON PROGRAMMES 
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While resisting obvious political propaganda, listeners continued to consume entertainment 
and music programmes. With the establishment of radio targeting African listeners, colonial 
information officers became aware of the necessity to integrate the new medium with local 
cultural forms so as to ensure that the station was attractive to local audiences. The plan to 
integrate African producers ― and not just announcers ― was also part of these deliberations. 
Therefore, particularly during the time of the Federation and as part of the FBC, the Lusaka 
station showed a two-sided face: while politically sensitive parts of the programme were 
brought under more and more tight control, the cultural and entertainment formats thrived, 
and African producers were relatively free in these sectors. Nevertheless, ideas about 
modernity and tradition were also very visible in these programmes. African and European 
broadcasters shared notions of authenticity and tradition that significantly influenced 
programme content. This is particularly visible in the selection of recording and broadcasting 
Zambian and other music. The CABS ran an extensive recording programme involving long 
tours through the territories with a specially equipped van. The dates and stops were 
announced beforehand on the station and chiefs and villagers were asked to prepare to 
perform ‘traditional’ songs that the station wanted recorded. As a result, the CABS boasted an 
extensive collection of Zambian music, and even published some of it via the South African 
label Gallo. 
 
Behind this grand archiving project stood notions of African musical traditions that fixed 
them in space and time. The main impulse to start the project was the idea that these 
traditions were dying out and ‘tribal’ African music, which was‘unadulterated’ (Northern 
Rhodesia Information Department 1950: 6) by European or (Latin) American styles and 
instruments, needed to be promoted via radio. Although radio programmes were geared 
towards producing modern subjects, social change was also to be mediated. The idea was to 
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provide specifically urban listeners with opportunities to stay in touch with their ‘traditions’, 
based on an essentialist idea of culture. The developing urban culture – above all, Zambian 
music that crossed local traditions as well as international (preferably Latin American) styles 
like jazz, rumba and calypso – only gradually became a part of programmes. This was mainly 
due to broadcasters’ sensitivity towards listener tastes. From very early on in its history, the 
CABS undertook efforts to find out about preferences of listeners; not only which 
programmes they liked best, but also what kind of music they preferred, how news 
programmes should be structured, and how the way presenters talked was perceived. The first 
statistic of listeners’ preferences for programmes and musical styles, published in 1950 
(Northern Rhodesia Information Department 1950: 14)8, already showed a strong preference 
for music programmes, especially request programmes, and for modern music. At the time of 
the survey, ‘Cowboy’ (i.e. hillbilly music) and ‘Town Songs’ (urban music from Zambia) 
were the most popular. Zambian listeners connected with popular culture elsewhere in 
African cities but broadcasters regretted this development and concluded that ‘the indigenous 
music is gradually dying out’ (Northern Rhodesia Information Department 1950: 14). 
 
Broadcasters’ ideas about ‘adulterated’ modern African music did not come out of nowhere. 
Both Alick Nkhata and Michael Kittermaster, the station’s head before 1953, had worked 
together with the ethnomusicologist Hugh Tracey in South Africa. By the time CABS was 
established, these ideas were entrenched in colonial cultural policies and significant funds 
were allocated to the archiving project, which resembled Tracey’s earlier efforts to archive 
music throughout the region. But the broadcasters could not follow through with music 
programming focused on ‘traditional’ music. Surveys and listener requests made clear that 
most listeners wanted contemporary music, be it ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ or any of the 
multiple styles in between such arbitrary categories. As entertainment programmes were seen 
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as a useful vehicle to produce modern subjects and reconcile ‘modern’ with ‘traditional’ 
values, they needed to be attractive to listeners. Therefore, broadcasters had to rethink their 
policies and ultimately their own attitude towards modern African music. In the 1950s, Alick 
Nkhata became one of the most popular Zambian musicians, precisely because he was able to 
create syncretic music that integrated new versions of Zambian traditional songs, guitar 
music, soukous, calypso and other internationally popular styles. Textually as well as 
musically, he was able to comment on social change, criticize the negative consequences of 
rapid urbanization (alcoholism, adultery) and express the feelings and anxieties of an 
uprooted migrant working class. This kind of music, together with popular music from all 
over the world, occupied more and more space in entertainment programming on CABS and 
the FBC. Broadcasters followed the development of listener tastes. 
 
Together with the evolution of styles, music formed a significant part of the nationalist 
political discourse that developed during the last decade of colonial rule in Zambia. In the 
controlled environment of the FBC, which produced news in English in the Salisbury 
headquarters and let censors check the translations in Lusaka and monitor the broadcasts, 
popular music styles and ambiguous texts were much better suited to transporting dissident 
opinions. Songs in Zambian languages were difficult to decode for federal informants 
monitoring the service. Most informants were missionaries or colonial administrators who did 
not speak local languages sufficiently to understand the subtle nuances used sometimes by 
newscasters. Even more subtle were the metaphors used in popular songs that, on the surface, 
dealt with all kinds of topics except politics. Veteran broadcaster Andreya Masiye (1977: 24f) 
in his book Singing for Freedom cites an abundance of songs that could be and were 
understood as political commentary by African listeners: 
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For instance, there was a sweet religious melody by a group of Watchtower adherents. It spoke 
about the wickedness of man who had exalted himself to a high position in this mundane world. 
Man was trampling on the rights of others, bringing untold misery and suffering. There was no 
peace. God Almighty would one day descend on them and punish such people. He would take 
away their brief authority. The exalted would be vanquished forever. And those who were 
suffering under the usurpers would live on to celebrate their victory. 
 
This tune was for a long time at the top of the weekly request programme hit parade. Christians, 
Muslims and heathens alike asked for it. The reason was obvious to both African broadcasters 
and listeners, but not to our European colleagues and supervisors. To the Africans, the hymn 
was not referring to an imaginary people in a fictitious situation. It was pointing to the Africans 
of Central Africa, particularly those of Northern Rhodesia. 
 
Such songs could subvert FBC policies of censorship as listeners who voted these to the top 
of the hit parade understood the political implications, while direct criticism was avoided. 
Only after African broadcasters started to accompany the songs with more explicit 
statements, ‘the British officials awoke to what was happening’ and ‘ruled that the song be 
banned from broadcasting’ (Masiye 1977: 25). 
 
These songs found their way into the programme through request programmes such as the 
hugely popular ‘Zimene Mwatifunsa’ (Spitulnik [2010: 183] translates the title as ‘Yours for 
the Asking’; Fraenkel [1959: 79] translates it as: ‘That Which You Have Asked For’). These 
programmes were hugely popular as they not only gave listeners the opportunity to hear the 
music they wanted but provided a useful medium for the exchange of news and messages 
over longer distances: births and deaths, engagements and marriages, the new address of a 
man changing his place of work, etc. (Powdermaker 1962: 224).9 As shown, European 
information officers were distrustful of modern African music and looked down on it. 
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However, the enormous popularity of request programmes made a cancellation practically 
impossible. Even the FBC only reduced the air time of these programmes but did not cancel 
them completely. 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, another political song followed the banned ‘Kitawala’ tune to 
the top of the hit parade. It was more outspoken but still managed to slip through censorship 
for a while. Masiye (1977: 21) cites parts of the song: 
 
Lidzafika liti dzuwa lopulumuka 
Kwa anthu amu Africa wosauka 
 
(ref.) Africa, mazunzo ndi ambiri 
Komabe tidzawagonjetsa 
When will Freedom day come 
For the poor African people 
 
(ref.) Africa, persecution is too much 
But we shall overcome 
The song was a Nyanja translation of one originally recorded by a broadcaster and musician 
working for the African Service in Salisbury, Sam Matambo, and his band, the City Quads. 
The original version had been censored before being broadcast, and "sanitized" into a 
"general appeal to God to help the suffering abantu abasundu, Black people" (Chikowero 
2015, 247f.). The Nyanja version, broadcast via Lusaka, made it to broadcast unchanged.Its 
verses seemed to be about either religious deliverance or freedom from slavery but the 
refrainreferred explicitly to ongoing struggles about political freedom. Matambo had 
composed the original song with Black American spirituals in mind, a tradition with 
significant influence on contemporary music in the region (Turino 2000, 363). Given the 
repressive nature of FBC broadcasting, it is astonishing that such a song could be played day 
and night. This was partly due to broadcasters’ cunning approach, ‘hiding’ such songs in 
between more innocuous English pop songs. In the end, this particular song was banned after 
an African announcer – who Masiye claims was an informant planted in the station by the 
Federal government – divulged its implications to the officials. 
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The development of the broadcasters’ and station’s stance towards music in Zambia shows 
the influence listeners ultimately had on radio programming. Although colonial officials may 
have thought entertainment programmes were an area in which leniency would not have big 
political consequences, Masiye’s account of what happened in the request and music 
programmes shows this to be a fallacy. With the news and actuality programmes under firm 
control, the more lenient attitude to entertainment programming and the relative liberty of 
broadcasters – who,  like many of their fellow countrymen, grew more and more nationalist 
over the decade – enabled these to become a crucial forum for nationalist discourse. In 1959, 
Masiye even produced a nationalist play which, however, was suppressed by Federal 
authorities and only broadcast after independence. With the success of the radical United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), which had managed to campaign for the African vote, 
and the establishment of its own radio broadcasts from Tanzania in 1962 (under direction of 
Masiye himself), nationalist discourse did no longer need to be hidden in music programmes 
but could openly be broadcast from abroad. While this specific discourse was the result of a 
collaboration between nationalist broadcasters and their audience, the shift from the rigid 
notion about traditional music to a more flexible attitude allowed for a more evolutional 
understanding which shows that listeners did actually influence programming quite directly 
and permanently. While colonial officials and settler politicians placed the emphasis in their 
media control and propaganda on news and actuality, the main function of entertainment was 
to accompany them. Although radio plays and the emphasis on ‘traditional’ music were 
geared at supporting the policy of producing modern but authentically African subjects, the 
simple fact that these programmes were decisive in keeping the audience before the radio set 




Despite these political changes and in spite of significant listener resistance to political 
propaganda, the biggest part of the audience agreed with radio’s – and other colonial media’s 
– message of modernization as a desirable process. Brian Larkin (2008) has referred to this as 
the ‘colonial sublime‘, the sense of awe connected with new technology and infrastructure. 
Radio, as the medium that brought modern technology into the private realm and because of 
its ability to communicate over vast distances and changing the sense of space, was one of the 
most important carriers of the ‘colonial sublime’.10 At the same time, radio connected the 
listener to other infrastructural projects, e.g. reporting from openings of cement factories, the 
building of roads or dams and so on. 
 
Radio use spread through the colony simultaneous to processes of ‘modernization’. ‘It 
coincided with the increasing industrialization of Central Africa and rapid increases in 
African incomes. Radio was becoming a “must”, a coveted symbol of status among a wide 
range of people’ (Fraenkel 1959: 137). In Zambia, as in other colonies, the medium was seen 
as an embodiment as well as a promoter of ‘development’: ‘[b]ridges, roads, health 
initiatives, and radio sets were combined into concrete, material expressions of the 
developmentalist work of the colonial regime and its continual aim of progress’ (Larkin 2008: 
61). Radio was one of many infrastructural projects of late colonialism but it also gave 
publicity to others. It acted as a ‘doubly articulated technology’, as a material object as well 
as a communication modality. ‘[R]adio was construed as a new and high status technology, 
which carried messages about what was high status and new’ (Spitulnik 1998: 68). It lent 
ideological coherence to the overall developmentalist project and moderated the problems 
that came with social change. For contemporary anthropologists, radio was ‘a reinforcing and 
contributing agent functioning with other social and economic agents of change’ 
(Powdermaker 1962: 252). It ‘gave meanings and clues to many problems in the new world 
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and some sense of control over it’ (Powdermaker 1962: 253). Therefore, while radio did 
certainly not produce modern subjects by itself, it was not only a central part of processes of 
modernization but promoted them and helped listeners make sense of social change. 
 
POST-COLONIAL RADIO AND ITS LISTENERS 
The post-colonial Zambian government had ideas similar to those of the colonial 
administration about the role that radio should play. The liberalization of the state 
broadcaster, which the colonial government had undertaken in 1963 in view of the upcoming 
independent elections, was retracted in 1965 and the semi-autonomous Corporation was 
integrated into the bureaucratic hierarchy. Consequently, a brochure issued by the newly 
formed Zambian Broadcasting Services (ZBS) read: ‘In this sense the Services are a mirror of 
Government to people and, by the use of public participation in their national programmes, of 
people to Government’ (Zambia Broadcasting Services n.d.: 2). Radio remained an 
instrument of information control for the government but politicians and broadcasters also 
retained the idea of using the medium to influence national identity. Politicians found 
themselves in a situation which had been described more than a century earlier by the Italian 
nationalist Massimo d’Azeglio: ‘We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’ 
(Hobsbawm 1990: 44). In African ‘nations of intent’ (Rotberg 1966: 37), this question posed 
itself much more urgently. 
 
In independent Zambia, the main goal was to use radio as an instrument of nation-building in 
order to make listeners identify as Zambians. Often, this was done in a blatantly 
propagandistic way, for example in the series ‘Nation and Humanism’, which connected the 
issue of national unity with President Kenneth Kaunda as a uniting figure and his 
‘philosophy’ of humanism. UNIP increasingly came to see itself as the embodiment as well as 
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the guarantor of national unity. The news, for example, was shaped around a simple principle: 
first reporting the actions of President Kaunda, then the Vice-President, the ministers and so 
on.11 However, while the ZBS was an instrument of propagating government policies, it was 
this function that for UNIP leaders was congruent with its mission of fostering national unity. 
 
In educational, cultural and entertainment programmes, the Zambian nation was constructed 
in more complex ways. Programming was organized so that Lozi, Tonga or Bemba cultural 
programmes were interwoven with formats like ‘Zambian jazz‘ or ‘Zambian musicians‘ that 
featured nationally produced music, drawing on the hybrid forms Alick Nkhata and others 
like him had established. This coincided with listeners’ tastes as an audience survey 
established in 1971: nearly half of all interviewees wanted more Zambian music on the radio. 
Subsequently, in 1973, the government introduced a 90 per cent quota for Zambian music on 
ZBS. Listeners’ request programmes like ‘Zimene Mwatifunsa’ also continued. These 
programmes again were geared at producing national subjects. At the same time, most visibly 
in the imagery of the radio magazine Nshila, the ideal of the modern, educated African 
continued to play an important role in media content. 
 
However, radio content also started to mirror the search for an authentically Zambian culture. 
In a programme called ‘Composers’ Corner’, Radio Zambia tried to encourage the use of 
traditional instruments by calling upon readers of Nshila magazine: ‘composers who make 
use of traditional instruments are invited to contact Isaiah Mapoma at the Broadcasting 
studios in Kitwe, when it may be found possible to broadcast their work’.12 In a later issue of 
the same magazine, a reviewer stated that Mapoma’s ‘African Music Feature’ reminded him 
of his childhood, when ‘traditional’ dances were the predominant entertainment, and 
concluded: ‘In actual fact, Isaiah Mapoma seem [sic] to be reviving the pure African music 
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and I think the talent will be fully restored’. As the examples show, the idea of a ‘traditional’, 
‘pure’, i.e. authentic, Zambian culture retained a powerful influence. While before 
independence, it had been formulated in essentialist terms of a static ‘African’ culture that 
had to be preserved and protected from the pitfalls of social change, it was now connected to 
a national cultural identity distinctly Zambian. This musical identity was brought forth by 
announcers such as Mapoma who selected ‘traditional’ music from all over the country and 
explained the significance of rhythms, melodies and texts to those listeners who knew little 
about it. At the same time, ZBS as a whole developed a policy of highlighting certain cultural 
hallmarks that belonged to specific regional traditions but were now taken to stand for the 
richness of Zambian culture as a whole. The most famous example is the Kuomboka 
ceremony of Barotseland which is held when the Zambezi overfloods the fertile Barotse plain 
in Eastern Zambia during the rainy season. When the water rises, the Litunga of Barotseland 
leads his people away from the Zambezi flood plain to higher ground. ZBS radio and 
television report live from the event, emphasizing the importance of the festivity for the 
Zambian nation. Today, the Kuomboka ceremony is well established as a Zambian (in 
addition to a Lozi) ceremony, symbolizing an elaborated tradition that goes back to 
precolonial times. Another is the Makishi which probably originated as a ritual connected to 
boys' initiation (mukanda) in the Lunda and Luvale regions in north-western Zambia but was 
described by David Livingstone already in the mid-19th century as a part of Lozi festivals in 
Barotseland where initiation ceremonies for either boys or girls are unknown. The Makishi 
featured prominently in the run-up to the flag changing ceremony on the eve of Zambian 
independence, and also in a propaganda film narrated by famous Zambian broadcaster Alick 
Nkhata and produced by the Kaunda government in 1964.13 Both events are heavily marketed 
as tourist events today. 
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Again, listeners reacted to these attempts in their own way. The biggest problem associated 
with making radio a tool of nation-building was that the full diversity of Zambian languages 
– and, consequently, cultures – could not be represented in a station with limited 
infrastructure and resources. Two channels, insufficient studios or staff, the challenge of 
translating centrally-produced news, and the absence of education and training for a more 
representative cast of producers and announcers all contributed to this problem. But listeners 
held the ZBS to its own standards and demanded adequate representation. For them to 
identify as Zambians, they wanted to be sure that as Lenje or Tonga they would be part of an 
inclusive national culture. 
 
These findings suggest that the constructivist notion which suggests that technological factors 
in combination with social advances – Anderson’s ‘print capitalism’ – were prerequisites for 
the formation of nations as ‘imagined communities’ needs to be extended and corrected in 
some significant aspects (Anderson 2006 [1991]: 33). Although Anderson does not go as far 
as Ernest Gellner, who discards media content altogether, both base their arguments on the 
form of mass media that enables the imagining of a relationship with people beyond one’s 
immediate social group (Anderson 2006, Gellner 1983: 127). Zambian politicians and 
broadcasters only too quickly realized that this was not enough to ‘make’ people Zambians. 
National identity did not develop in a quasi-automatic McLuhanian process of media 
reception but in and through discussions, negotiations, disturbances and resistances centred 
on radio as a mass medium. Anderson’s argument is very much connected to a specific and 
very different historical context. However, theories of the problem of nationalism in Africa 
have not gone beyond determining a failure of such a process in Africa. In many accounts, 
whether academic or journalistic, the ‘failure’ of African states has often been attributed to 
their ‘artificiality’. But, as a closer look at the contemporary history of the continent shows 
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and as many analysts have since pointed out, the nation-state in Africa has proven quite 
stable.14 This is especially true in the cases presented here which prove that regional or 
‘ethnic’ conflicts have never threatened the integrity of the nation-state as a whole. Recent 
analyses of national identity in Africa have emphasized the significance of cultural 
production and the connections between popular culture and ‘official’, political, nation-
building efforts, taking into account Michael Billig’s notion of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 
1995; Young 2007; Askew 2002; Moorman 2008). 
 
THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE ALLOCATION 
Months before the country became independent, radio producers and managers had 
established that language diversity was to become a main issue for listeners in post-colonial 
Zambia. The Northern Rhodesian/Zambian Broadcasting Corporation (NRBC/ZBC), which 
was created on 1 January 1964 with the intention of preparing the ground for a future public 
broadcaster, received demands to include the respective languages of the complainants in 
programming. A letter to the station shows the complexity of the problem the broadcaster was 
facing: ‘The Tonga, Lenje and Ila are known as the “Bantu Botatwe” (which means “The 
Three Peoples”), and I understand that they are represented on the ZBC by the Tonga. But 
Tonga is such a difficult language with lots of phrases which a Lenje-speaking person cannot 
understand’.15 Although these problems had existed before and although a significant 
majority of listeners in urban areas (77 per cent)16 listened to radio content in other languages 
than their own, the problem had been ignored by politicians and broadcasters, if not even 
enforced by colonial ideas about ‘standardizing’ the diverse languages. Now, the rural 
population in particular started to demand full representation of their respective languages in 
compliance with the national doctrine that declared all ethnic groups in Zambia as ‘equally 
different’. Spitulnik (1992: 339) has described the intricacies of this policy as follows: 
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National discourse thus attempts to diffuse the political dimensions of ethnicity at the same time 
that it promotes an image of the state as tolerant of diversity. References to the more volatile 
differences between ethnic groups, particularly their inequalities in population, political 
positions, and economic resources, are avoided at all costs. Furthermore, there is no direct 
discussion of ethnic favouritism or conflict at the national level (except to denounce them), 
although both significantly structure social relations and politics, and are frequent topics of 
everyday conversation. 
 
Spitulnik here refers to the situation in Zambia at the end of the 1980s but this discourse was 
already formed early in the independent country’s history. From 1964 onwards, Kaunda 
condemned ‘tribalism’ as a discriminatory practice and balanced political appointments so 
that representatives of all ethnic groups would be integrated into the political system. After 
the introduction of the one-party state, fears of a tribalist revival and ethnic conflict were also 
raised to argue against multi-party democracy: ‘The national claim to build unity, fend off 
tribalism, and also encourage unique ethnic cultures, creates a cautious pluralism within 
bounds, where diversity always verges on divisiveness, and where attention to difference 
itself borders on subversion’ (Spitulnik 1992: 339). This national discourse was dominated by 
UNIP who after Independence struggled to keep its dominant position in the political system. 
‘[T]he drive for political supremacy was entwined with UNIP’s search for national unity, seen 
as the prerequisite for nation-building’ (Phiri 2006: 132). These issues played out in a very 
concrete and direct way on Zambia’s state broadcaster but it also had an effect on Zambian 
society and the spaces different ethnic groups occupied in it. The choice of the seven 
broadcast languages was taken over from colonial times and it left a strong legacy in which 
languages were ‘associated with different prestige values and domains of use in the national 
context, primarily through the ”uneven development” of the ethnic groups speaking them and 
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their concurrent unequal valuation in broadcasting’ (Spitulnik 1992: 341). Thus, after the 
change to ZBS, the selection of ‘the big two‘ – Bemba and Nyanja – as linguae francae 
broadcast on the ‘General Service‘, although rooted in social realities, continued to be 
contested by listeners: ‘Some languages have more hours [and] only two of the seven 
languages are on the General Service. [This is] unfair as far as the motto “One Zambia, One 
Nation” is concerned’ (Spitulnik 1992: 344). Thus the invocation of the national motto could 
backfire when listeners refused to accept the glossing over inequalities and silent preferences 
given to the ‘big two’ practised in Zambian language policy. 
 
The hierarchy of languages was not only apparent in the allocation of time and spots in the 
programme schedule but also in terms of staff, infrastructural resources and consequently 
programme content. The division between the two channels – the ‘General Service’ as 
nationally inclusive channel and the ‘Home Service‘ as the one devoted to the diversity of 
languages and cultures – went beyond the symbolics of labelling. For example, as the news 
was produced centrally, it reached the Home Service only after having gone through a 
translation process. Thus, news in the vernacular languages was ‘stale’, having been 
broadcast on the General Service a few hours before. Listeners as well as broadcasters got the 
impression that the Home Service was inferior to the General Service. A government-
sponsored report in 1968 recommended that: 
 
[N]ews broadcasts on the Home Service should be as up to date as those on the General Service, 
if Government is to discontinue giving the impression that those who do not understand English 
do not deserve to be as well informed as those who do.17 
 
The ZBS was caught in a dilemma that would accompany it for the whole 25 years of its 
existence: giving priority to the nationwide General Service met with sharp protests from 
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listeners who felt discriminated against while shifting the weight more to the Home Service 
meant turning away from the policy of nation-building. In the words of the report: ‘Local 
pride should be enhanced positively to promote economic development, but it should not be 
allowed to grow to an extent where it could have negative results, such as promoting 
parochialism’ (Anon. 1981). The solution the report proposed was to distribute experienced 
broadcasters equally among all language sections and to send recording teams to all regions 
to record traditional music and interviews and then broadcast them in the General Service. 
 
An audience survey in 1971 confirmed this diagnosis: the preference for programmes and 
assessments from the Service did not vary along regional lines but rather between social 
groups, and predominantly depended on the education of interviewees. For example, younger 
and better educated listeners favoured international music on the radio while the majority 
demanded more Zambian music (Institute of African Studies 1971). However, there were 
simply not enough resources to return to the extensive recording project of the CABS. 
 
The issue of ‘stale’ news on the Home Service that the 1968 report brought up pertained to all 
these areas. Broadcasters were convinced that the General Service was valued higher and 
tried to move there. The news on the Home Service came late because there were not enough 
translators for the respective languages and listeners complained that they had to put up with 
yesterday’s news. The same report gave some prominence to the issue of language and 
explained that listeners, when asked, continued to complain that ‘their’ respective language 
was either not broadcast at all or allocated too little time, and that Bemba and Nyanja were 
allocated ‘what they claimed to be excessively long hours of broadcasting […]’ (Anon 1968: 
37). The answer of the Commission shows that the issue of language hierarchy was 
intertwined with larger issues of cultural and political hegemony of ethnic groups in Zambia. 
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In the end, the report deferred a real solution to the future: ‘It may be the education of the 
people of Zambia which will in the long run solve the problem’ (Anon 1968: 37). With this, 
the authors showed themselves remarkably close in attitude to Harry Franklin who, like 
Kittermaster, had envisioned radio as the modernizing agent that could dissolve the African 
‘babel of tongues’ and support an ‘eventual development of one African tongue’ (Franklin 
1950: 16). Language division, as Spitulnik’s research has shown, would remain a major 
problem in broadcasting for decades to come. 
 
NEGOTIATING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
For the management of the ZBS as well as the listeners, the problem of language allocation 
was only part of much larger issues. As a government department, the ZBS now placed an 
emphasis on the five-year economic National Development Plan that the government began 
to implement from 1966 onwards. Multilingual listeners interpreted the existence or non-
existence of their respective language in programmes as a marker of which ethnic group was 
hegemonic in Zambian society, politics and culture. To include more languages in 
programmes was not just an issue of reaching more listeners; it was above all a question of 
which cultures and ethnic groups were a significant part of the Zambian nation and which 
were not. Listeners voiced complaints not just because they did not understand the languages 
but because they felt their specific culture was underrepresented in the respective 
programmes. Lamba-speaking listeners, who neither expressed nor showed problems in 
understanding Bemba (a related language), nevertheless demanded to be included in cultural 
programming: ‘The addition of Lamba or Lala in radio broadcasting would enable us to have 
our traditional music. The young ones are forgetting their ancestral life’. Mytton (1974: 67), 




The desire to preserve the language, and with it the culture and traditions of the Lamba people, 
was prompted by the desire to guard against domination by a larger group. There was little 
doubt that the Lamba people understood Bemba language broadcasts; the objection was not 
connected to the problem of comprehension. There were those who would accept the use of 
Bemba language on the radio realising that with the large number of languages and dialects in 
Zambia it would be unrealistic to expect the ZBS to use all of them. Nevertheless, such people 
said, this should not lead to the almost total exclusion of the music and culture of those other 
language groups which are supposed to be catered for by the Bemba language broadcasts.  
 
All these findings show that the language issue was not about understanding; it was about 
which ‘ethnic’, language or cultural groups were an important part of the Zambian nation and 
which were negligible minorities. Listeners clearly balanced regional or ‘ethnic’ identities 
with national identity, asking for their place as e.g. Lamba in the Zambian nation. This shows 
that local or ethnic and national identity are not opposed in as sharp a contrast as proponents 
of the ‘autochthony’ model have claimed (Geschiere 2009). It can also serve as a starting 
point for explanations of the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of ethnic conflict and the 
insistence on the importance of national unity (Young 2007). 
 
The Home Service failed to include all ethnic groups and programmes were dominated by the 
respective culture of hegemonic languages. Given that the pronounced policy of the Zambian 
government and, consequently, of ZBS was to treat all ethnic groups equally and individually, 
the broadcaster failed to deliver. Additionally, when asked if they favoured more or less 
Zambian music on the radio, many listeners added that they would actually prefer ‘their own’ 
music, i.e. ‘traditional’ music of their respective ethnic group. CABS had set a high standard 
with their regular and frequent recording tours; a standard its successor – because of lack of 
infrastructure – failed to meet. ‘Many times the survey interviewers were asked: “When is the 
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ZBS going to come and record our music?” The question was [...] related closely in listeners’ 
minds to the language questions’ (Mytton 1974: 74). Mytton as well as the Siyomunji Report 
strongly recommended stepping up the recording van scheme. As both reports argued, 
 
[t]hat way [listeners] would feel they were participating in broadcasting. It would also give them 
a sense of ‘belonging’ to a national community of cultures in which their own played a visible 
(or audible) part. This attitude tended to be regarded by some in authority as parochial or 
‘tribal’ attitude. In effect though it may be the exact opposite. The national identity the ZBS was 
supposed to promote might well have been assisted by a greater attention to particular local 
cultures and local traditions (Mytton 1974: 74). 
 
Despite the recommendations, ZBS – mainly because of drastic budget cuts – could not 
return to the CABS practice of recording. The whole issue went unresolved. Added to that 
was the fact that younger listeners in particular wanted to hear more modern African music, 
and the lack of transmitters that failed to ensure nation-wide coverage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter looked at how the relations of production were structured in ‘classic’ mass 
media in colonial and post-colonial societies. Most importantly, the sources show that far 
from being completely separated, the sphere of production and consumption actually 
influenced each other. Because the ideological projects of both the colonial administration 
and the post-colonial nationalist government lay much emphasis on radio, the bitter 
propaganda pill did not just have to be sugar-coated with entertainment programmes but also 
needed to provide useful services in order to reach their audience. Listeners, even in the most 
controlled media environments, did not just reinterpret content but also tried to actively 
influence it. In areas like the entertainment programmes, there was some space for such an 
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influence. While the decision of broadcasters and governments to leave some freedom for 
influence in entertainment formats was motivated by the need to let listeners actively engage 
with the medium in order to not only get the message across but to actually influence 
personal lives and identities to the extent of making Africans ‘modern’, this relative liberty 
could be used by listeners to influence media content in ways not envisioned by the 
propagandists. This is most clearly visible in African broadcasters’ and listeners’ 
collaboration in making music programmes a realm of nationalist discourse in an extensively 
censored environment. 
 
From this example, it can be argued that we need to extend circulation models of media 
production and reception to include the more direct dynamics playing out between producers 
and audiences. Rather than just media content circulating in one direction, all actors involved 
in production and reception of media content try to influence it. Audiences are not limited to 
the relatively passive role of listening, reading or viewing and then making sense of content. 
From the very first beginnings of radio in African colonies, they played an important and 
active ― albeit indirect ― role in not just programming but in the actual set-up of radio. The 
very decision to establish radio for Africans was due to the colonial officials’ realization that, 
if the administration did not offer an attractive alternative, people would listen to other, 
potentially subversive radio stations. Broadcasters were very sensitive to their audiences’ 
demands, and to uphold effective propaganda they had to give the audience what it wanted in 
entertainment programmes. Ironically, this eventually even subverted propaganda when the 
station in order to pander to the audience had to broadcast modern pop, ‘adulterated’ music. 
 
However, it is important not to neglect the asymmetry of power in these relations of 
production. Listeners’ influence was tolerated as long as it could be used to advance the 
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larger projects of modernizing Africans or to forge a new nation by changing identities. 
Therefore, it was limited. Nevertheless, broadcasters were always aware of the fact that 
programmes had to appeal to consumers to be accepted. On the other hand, the overall 
ideological projects of the colonial as well as the post-colonial state were also limited. The 
ideas they introduced could be taken up by listeners and turned against the state if it did not 
provide what was promised – a modern life (which Zambians equated with social and 
material advance), or the integration of different social and cultural groups into the 
framework of the nation. Modernity and the nation in radio were not created in official 
projects that connected political power with the political and social spaces the medium was 
supposed to construct. They were negotiated in an interactive communication between 
listeners and broadcasters; a process that took place in all kinds of programmes, including 
those that had not consciously been designed for the purpose. The discussions about which 
languages should be present in programmes did not necessarily have an anti-national 
character. Rather, they were discussions about the relationship of national identity to other 
identities – political, social, ethnic or otherwise – that played a role in listeners’ lives. Thus, 
radio as an electronic mass medium was not a simple top-down instrument for the 
dissemination of ideology, and listeners were far more than just consumers, although they 
were not ‘produsers’ either. In an asymmetrical power relationship between producers and 
consumers, listeners retained some influence and set limits to the overarching ideological 
projects that determined radio content in Africa for much of the century. 
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1 A critical, albeit slightly ontological, theoretical approach to the internet as a medium has been brought 
forward by Galloway (2004). For a more cautious approach to the role of new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in Africa, see Banda et al. (2009). 
2 The development in Portuguese colonies and in the Belgian Congo was somewhat different as broadcasting 
was a private venture (Power 2000). 
3 The Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, also called the Central African Federation, was a peculiar 
constitutional construct uniting the three British colonies, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, under the roof of a central government voted into power by white settlers, and the still existing 
British colonial administration. It was established after years of political pressure from settlers and significantly 
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extended their influence. Because the overwhelming majority of settlers lived in Southern Rhodesia and was 
very conservative, and because agrarian Southern Rhodesia profited the most from closer union with the 
industrial mines of the North, Africans especially in the other two territories felt that this was a move to further 
subjugate them economically and politically. Therefore, the introduction of the Federation met with widespread 
but ultimately unsuccessful resistance (Rotberg 1967; Phiri 2006). 
4 Cited in East Africa and Rhodesia (1947). Parts of this scheme were later integrated into a five-year 
‘propaganda campaign’ started by CABS in 1950 (Northern Rhodesia Information Department 1950: 6). 
5 The ‘Saucepan Special’ was the name given to the first battery-powered radio, developed specifically to be 
useful for and affordable to an African audience. The name comes from the use of actual aluminium saucepans 
for the hull of the speaker. The model quickly spread throughout the colonies (cf. Smyth 1984). 
6 Nearly all issues of these magazines (except The African Listener before it was renamed as Nshila – ‘The 
Way’ in 1958) are available at the National Archives of Zambia, which holds an impressive newspaper 
collection. 
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